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Currently, theminimally conscious state (MCS) is diagnosed
based on a set of behavioral criteria, which often fail to
distinguish the MCS from the vegetative state (VS). As a
remedy for the high rate of misdiagnosis, David Fischer
and Robert Truog (2013) recommend using interactive ca-
pacity (IC), which is “the ability to receive communicated
information . . . and the intentional generation of a coherent
response” (30), as diagnostic of MCS.
CONSCIOUSNESS OF ENVIRONMENT AND CON-
SCIOUSNESS OF SELF
The difference between VS and MCS is consciousness,
which the authors define as “the awareness of one’s self
and environment” (26). But it is controversialwhether these
two senses of consciousness—awareness of one’s self and
awareness of one’s environment—can be collapsed into one
(Block 1995; Rosenthal 2004). The problem is compounded
by the ambiguity of the concept of self-consciousness it-
self. Self-consciousness can refer, for example, to embar-
rassment, awareness of one’s identity, or the ability to
introspect.
The sense of self-consciousness relevant to the present
discussion is typically characterized as conscious experi-
ence. Conscious experiences are those of which we are in
some way aware, while unconscious experiences are those
of which we are not aware in any way. One may resist this
distinction and insist that there is no such thing as an expe-
rience of the environmentwithout awareness of that experi-
ence. However, the evidence of experience without aware-
ness is compelling (for review see Dehaene and Changeux
2011).
In light of the distinction between these two types of
consciousness, the authors’ proposal should be understood
to be about conscious experience, that is, consciousness of
oneself in the relevant sense. Consciousness of the environ-
ment absent conscious experience may not carry the same
kind of moral significance relevant to management of care
and end-of-life decisions. Given this, for the remainder of
this commentary, we assume that what the authors propose
is that IC is a sufficient condition for conscious experience.
Thus clarified, the positive proposal of the article becomes
suspect.
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NEUROSCIENTIFICADVANCESANDTHENEEDFOR IN-
TERACTIVE CAPACITY
The evidence for IC as a sufficient condition for conscious
experience comes from a number of recent neuroimaging
studies of patients diagnosed as in VS (for review see Owen
2013). For example, one patient diagnosed to be in VS by
behavioral criteria was shown to nonetheless intentionally
generate objectively measurable neural responses that in-
dicated the patient understood the experimenter’s instruc-
tions to imagine oneself playing tennis (Owen et al. 2006).
This kind of evidence is very compelling and suggests that
advances in brain imagining technology can help better dis-
tinguish patients in VS from patients in MCS. But it is not
obvious how it can help establish IC as a diagnostic thresh-
old of conscious experience.
According to the authors, patients who are in MCS1,
MCS2, and MCS3 are all conscious in the relevant sense. In
MSC1, consciousness is undetectable using either behav-
ioral measures or current technology, which means that
these patients are “diagnostically indistinguishable” from
patients in VS. According to the authors, in order to pick
these patients out and delineate them fromVSpatients, clin-
icians may be tempted to use more sensitive technological
methods to detect consciousness.
As the authors note, this approach is doubly problem-
atic. On the one hand, there is a risk of mistaking neu-
ral activity indicative of consciousness of the environment,
which can occur without conscious experience, for signs of
conscious experience, thus overdiagnosing patients in VS as
minimally conscious. On the other hand, this approach falls
short of definitively indicating conscious experience, since
evenmore advanced and sensitive technologymaymiss the
relevant neural activity. The authors’ proposal aims to avoid
these problems.
LIMITATIONS OF INTERACTIVE CAPACITY
Unfortunately, the two given reasons for adopting IC as a
sufficient condition for conscious experience are not con-
vincing. The first reason given is that IC is consistent with
the traditionally used behavioral criteria andwould thereby
be easily integrated with current practice thus facilitat-
ing the transition for clinicians and the public. The high
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rate of misdiagnosis under the behavioral criteria makes
it puzzling why being consistent with it would be a good
thing. The authors acknowledge the high rate of misdiag-
nosis and seem to think that their proposal can help re-
duce this percentage. In light of all this, the first offered
reason for accepting IC as an indirect marker of conscious-
ness of oneself is somewhat self-defeating and not very
convincing.
The second reason that the authors give is that there is
a “general agreement that interactive capacity . . . is a reli-
able indicator of consciousness” (30). This claim is doubly
misleading. First, reliable indicators are not the same as suf-
ficient conditions. Second, there is a good deal of disagree-
ment about what reliably indicates conscious experience.
Something is a reliable indicator of something else only
if it is highly correlated with it. Smoke, for example, is a
reliable indicator of fire, but it is neither a sufficient or nec-
essary condition for it. There are fires that produce no smoke
and ways to make smoke without fire. Perhaps this is why
smoke is not used as a diagnostic of fire. What the authors
seem to have in mind is the stronger claim that IC is indeed
sufficient for conscious experience, not merely a reliable
indicator of it. Treating IC as a diagnostic threshold of con-
scious experience would require as much.
But let us assume that what the authors have in mind
is the weaker claim, that IC is a reliable indicator and not a
sufficient condition. Can they now better support their pro-
posal? Arguably, no, and this is because contrary to what
the authors suggest, there seems to be little agreement in the
empirical or philosophical literature on what reliably corre-
lates with conscious experience. The only generally agreed-
upon reliable indicators of conscious experience seem to be
subjective verbal reports (Seth et al. 2008).
Given the state of the field, even if IC can serve as a
reliable indicator of conscious experience, other measures
could do just as well. Indeed, different neurobiological ac-
counts of consciousness would recommend different neural
correlates. Among these we could count activity in the pre-
frontal cortex (Lau and Passingham 2006), recurrent activ-
ity (Lamme and Roelfsema 2000), global accessibility (Baars
2005), or specific kinds of neuronal oscillations (Crick and
Koch 1990).
What the authors need to support their recommenda-
tion of IC as a diagnostic marker of conscious experience is
a theory-independent reason to believe that “the ability to
receive communicated information . . . and the intentional
generation of a coherent response” is as good as or better
than any of the other indicators of consciousness. Without
such a reason, IC should not be adopted as a diagnostic
threshold of self-consciousness over any of these other op-
tions.
In addition, adopting IC as the marker of conscious-
ness does not address the problem of how to treat pa-
tients who are in the MCS1 category, that is, those who
“retain an interactive capacity that is undetectable by cur-
rent technologies or entirely lack the capacity to interact”
(30). This puts in doubt the entire enterprise of the arti-
cle. If IC is undetectable under certain conditions, what
reason do we have to adopt it as a diagnostic thresh-
old that would weigh in on end-of-life decisions? To play
this role, it seems, IC would have to be a necessary, and
not merely a sufficient, condition for conscious experience.
And it would certainly have to be more than a reliable
indicator.
INTERACTIVE CAPACITY AS ONE OF THE RELIABLE
INDICATORS OF MCS?
The arguments presented by Fischer and Truog for adopt-
ing IC as a diagnostic ofMCS are tooweak to be convincing.
However, the empirical results that they cite in support of
their view are compelling and suggest what might be a bet-
ter way of distinguishing patients in VS andMCS. The neu-
ral correlates of IC and related capacities would certainly
be useful as a part of a pluralistic approach that takes into
account a variety of signatures of conscious experience dis-
cussed in the neuroscience literature. The techniques used
in neuroscience can provide a suite of reliable indicators of
conscious experience that, in sum, can serve as a diagnostic
threshold of MCS.
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